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Abstract 
This paper provides the first empirical analysis directly comparing the effects of customs 
unions (CUs) and free-trade agreements (FTAs) on members’ bilateral trade, while 
addressing the biases arising from loglinearization of the gravity model and crucial time-
invariant unobservables. Since Fiorentino et al. (2007) question the popularity of CUs 
relative to FTAs, considering the latter to be more practical in the current trading 
climate, such a comparison seems especially relevant. While Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) find an FTA to approximately double members’ bilateral trade after 10 years, the 
results of this paper find CUs to have had a much larger impact than FTAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In today’s trading climate, the relevance of analyzing preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) cannot be overemphasized. The effective number of such agreements exceed 
200, with Mongolia being the only World Trade Organization (WTO) member not party 
to one. The notification of more than 50 PTAs to the WTO between January 2005 and 
December 2006, coupled with the ongoing negotiations of numerous agreements, 
indicate their recent proliferation and unabated rise in years to come. If all the PTAs 
currently under negotiation and proposal are implemented, then one would be looking at 
over 400 PTAs by 2010 (Fiorentino et al., 2007). Hence, policy issues associated with 
trade agreements are relevant for some time to come. 
 
Any PTA is essentially an arrangement among countries whereby members engage in 
trade at reduced tariff rates. If the members eliminate tariffs internally while maintaining 
their individual external tariffs, a free-trade area or free-trade agreement (FTA) is 
formed. In case they also unify their external tariffs, the arrangement is termed a 
customs union (CU). Prominent FTAs include the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), whereas Mercosur comprises an example of a CU. 
 
The literature on preferential agreements has addressed a host of associated policy 
issues. Unfortunately, analyses pertaining to a comparison of the types of PTAs have 
received relatively less attention. Perhaps Krueger (1997, p. 171) best expresses this, 
stating: “Surprisingly . . . there has been little analysis of different types of preferential 
arrangements, and in particular, of free trade agreements in contrast to customs 
unions.” Clausing (2000), the only contribution to the author’s knowledge after Krueger 
(1997) in terms of directly comparing FTAs and CUs, also alludes to this lack of 
attention. However, both Krueger (1997) and Clausing (2000) are theoretical 
contributions. Accordingly, the empirical literature seems to be even more lacking in this 
respect.  This paper fills the gap by analyzing a straightforward question: do countries 
belonging to a CU engage in more bilateral trade (in goods) on average than countries 
belonging to an FTA? 
 
Such a comparison of FTAs and CUs is of great relevance. With their greater recent 
proliferation relative to CUs, FTAs account for 84% of all the PTAs notified and in force 
(Fiorentino et al., 2007). The proportion of FTAs to CUs is even higher if one considers 
the PTAs currently under negotiation. Accordingly, Fiorentino et al. (2007, p. 5) question 
the popularity of CUs and consider them to be “out of tune with today’s trading climate.” 
In light of this, the findings of this paper are especially significant. 
 
Using the gravity model and data from Baier and Bergstrand (2007, BB hereafter), this 
paper compares the effects of FTAs and CUs on members’ volume of bilateral 
trade.While doing this, two sources of potential bias are recognized. First, as suggested 
by BB (2007), cross-section estimates of the PTA coefficients suffer from a potential 
bias if country-pairs select into agreements on the basis of time-invariant 
unobservables. Second, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) invoke Jensen’s inequality 
and recommend estimating gravity models using the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PPML) estimator as ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates may be biased if 
the PPML specification suffers from heteroskedasticity. Once the biases arising from 
crucial unobservables, or log-linearization of the gravity model are addressed, the 
results are striking. BB (2007, p. 72) find that, “on average, an FTA approximately 
doubles two members’ bilateral trade after 10 years.” However, using the same data, 
the results of this paper indicate that it is a CU, and not an FTA, which is responsible for 
this. More generally, members of a CU are found to engage in significantly greater 
volumes of bilateral trade than FTA members. Hence, analyses which do not allow for 
the effects of FTAs and CUs to differ, fail to capture this crucial aspect of trade policy 
decisions. 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
Cross-Section Analysis 
Gravity models are estimated using the PPML estimator and OLS to compare the 
effects of FTAs and CUs. The specification for the PPML method is given by 
 
(1)    
 
Here, Tij is the nominal value of exports from country i to country j; Dij is the distance 
between i and j; langij is a dummy variable taking the value one if i and j share a 
common language (zero otherwise); adjij is a binary variable assuming the value unity if 
i and j share a land border (zero otherwise); FTAij (CUij) is a dummy variable taking the 
value one if i and j are part of an FTA (CU) and zero otherwise; and qi and qj are 
country-specific dummies.3 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that (1) may be 
estimated using an estimator that is numerically equivalent to the PPML estimator, 
provided 
 
(2)    
 
The OLS specification is instead given by  
 
(3)    
 
Consistent estimation of (3) requires 
 
(4)    
 
However, as noted by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), (2) does not imply (4) 
(invoking Jensen’s inequality); in fact, the OLS elasticity estimates may be biased if the 
PPML specification suffers from heteroskedasticity. Henderson and Millimet (2008) find 
this concern relevant and recommend estimating the gravity model using the PPML. 
This also avoids the omission of observations with zero trade flows or the use of other 
ad hoc measures to address it. 
 
 
Panel Analysis 
The cross-section estimates are likely to be biased due to endogenous trade 
agreements. An excellent account of the endogeneity issue, and the failure of previous 
cross-section studies to address it, can be found in BB (2007). Although Magee (2003) 
attempts to address it by relying on instrumental variables (IV), the quality of the 
instruments used is clearly suspect. It is unlikely that variables like GDP similarities or 
differences in relative factor endowments between two countries are uncorrelated with 
unobservables affecting the volume of trade between them. Moreover, the difficulty of 
coming up with a valid instrument in the context of trade agreements compels BB (2007, 
p. 83) to conclude that “IV estimation is not a reliable method for addressing the 
endogeneity bias.” 
 
The panel fixed effects approach, with pairs of countries as the basic unit of 
observation, addresses the endogeneity issue to a certain extent. It allows one to 
control for pairwise time-invariant unobservables which affect the volume of trade 
between two countries, and are also correlated with their decision to form an 
agreement. Hence, the panel fixed effects estimates are a definite improvement over 
the cross-section estimates. 
 
However, the bias arising from the OLS specification is a separate issue. Panel OLS 
estimates may still be biased and lead to “misleading conclusions” in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the PPML model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006, p. 641). In 
keeping with this recommendation and the ones in Henderson and Millimet (2008) and 
Liu (2009), the panel analysis is mainly conducted using the PPML specification which 
is given by 
 
(5)    
 
In this case, Tijt is the real value of exports from country i to country j at time t. While 
distance, language, and adjacency drop out of (5), being captured by the panel fixed 
effects, the other variables have an additional t subscript. Accordingly, FTAijt (CUijt) 
takes the value one if i and j are part of an FTA (CU) at time t and zero otherwise; and 
qit and qjt are the country-by-time dummies. The unobservable term is decomposed into 
time-varying and time-invariant components such that hijt = uijteit. The panel fixed effects 
method provides consistent estimates even in the presence of any correlation between 
the time-invariant unobservables eij and the trade agreement dummies. 
 
While trade agreements usually have a phase-in period, some of the effects may 
actually precede the date of the agreement. Hence, some of the panel specifications 
include lag and lead terms of the trade agreement dummies to capture any lagged or 
anticipatory effects. BB (2007, p. 90) also recommend the inclusion of lag terms since 
trade agreements involve changes in countries’ terms of trade, which “tend to have 
lagged effects on trade volumes.” In other words, some panel specifications include 
variables like FTAij,t-k and CUij,t-k, or FTAij,t+k and CUij,t+k.The variable FTAij,t-k (CUij,t-k) is 
simply the kth lag of FTAijt (CUijt) and captures the lagged effects of the FTA (CU). 
Similarly, the variable FTAij,t+k (CUij,t+k) is the kth lead of FTAijt (CUijt) and captures any 
anticipatory effect. 
 
3. The Data 
The data come from BB (2007); thus, only limited details are provided. The nominal 
bilateral trade flows are from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics for the years 1960 to 2000, at five-year intervals. For the panel analysis, 
exporter GDP deflators are used to generate the real trade flows. The bilateral 
distances and the language and adjacency dummies are calculated from the CIA 
Factbook. Although the trade agreement dummies continue to be defined by an 
agreement’s year of entry, they involve a crucial modification. While BB (2007) 
considered a single dummy variable, which pooled the “full (no partial) FTAs and 
customs unions” together, here their effects are allowed to differ (p. 84). 
 
In keeping with the original data, the classification of trade agreements into the two PTA 
types is based on the sources listed in Table 3 in BB (2007). For further clarity, Table 
A1, in the Appendix, lists the FTAs and CUs considered along with the relevant years. 
In addition, the trade agreement dummy in the original data involved errors, which have 
been corrected. 
 
4. Results 
Cross-Section Results 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the cross-section results for the years 1960, 1970, . . . 
, 2000.While Table 1 reports results using the OLS specification excluding observations 
with zero bilateral trade, Table 2 reports the OLS results after replacing the zeros by 
ones. The issue of dealing with the zero trade values does not arise in the PPML 
specification, whose results are presented in Table 3. For all the cross-section results, 
columns (a) and (b) do not consider separate dummies for FTAs and CUs, where (a) 
uses the original trade agreement dummy from BB (2007) and (b) reports results after 
incorporating the corrections to it.7 The coefficient estimates and their statistical 
significance hardly differ across (a) and (b) in any of the cross-section tables. Thus, the 
results of the paper are not sensitive to the corrections. Column (c) considers the 
differential effects of FTAs and CUs. Results from the OLS specifications (Tables 1 and 
2) indicate mostly negative coefficients on the FTA and CU dummies. This is similar to 
the cross-section findings in BB (2007), who only offer omitted variables bias as an 
explanation. In Table 1, the null hypothesis of equality between the FTA and CU 
coefficients is rejected, at the 5% level, for all years except 1970. Table 2 reports a 
similar rejection for all years except 1960 and 1970. Hence, the cross-section OLS 
findings suggest that, post-1970, FTA and CU members engage in significantly different 
volumes of bilateral trade. For all instances of rejection of the null, in Tables 1 and 2, the 
coefficient on CU is more negative than the FTA coefficient. 
 
Results from the PPML specification are strikingly different. The statistically significant 
coefficients on FTA and CU are all positive. The p-values, in Table 3, signify a  
 
 
Table 1. Cross-Section Estimates of the OLS Specification (excluding observations with zero 
trade) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Cross-Section Estimates of the OLS Specification (including observations with zero 
trade) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Cross-Section Estimates of the PPML Specification (including observations with zero 
trade) 
 
 
 
rejection of the null of equality for 1960 and 1970 only. Hence, the PPML results imply 
that the volume of bilateral trade is significantly different among FTA and CU members 
up to 1970. It will be interesting to see what the panel results have to offer. Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro (2006) also find striking differences in their Monte Carlo simulations, 
across the two cross-section specifications. They further claim that (p. 641), “OLS yields 
significantly larger effects for geographical distance.” The results in Tables 1, 2, and 3 
are consistent with this too. Thus, regardless of the endogeneity due to omitted 
variables, the potential endogeneity arising from the OLS specification seems to be of 
significant relevance by itself. In fact, the potential bias from using OLS is large enough 
to render the positive and significant PPML coefficient estimates insignificant, or even 
negative and significant. The cross-section findings further support PPML estimation. 
 
Panel Results 
Unlike the cross-section estimates, the panel results, reported in Table 4, allow for an 
unambiguous ranking of FTAs and CUs with respect to their effect on members’ volume 
of bilateral trade. Column (a) does not consider any lagged or anticipatory effects of the 
trade agreements; (b) allows for single lags of FTA and CU; (c) considers two lags of 
each; and (d) allows for two lags and one lead.  Across all specifications, the 
coefficients on CU are positive and significantly greater than the FTA coefficients. 
Individual and joint tests reject the equality of the coefficients on FTA and CU, and on 
their lag and lead terms, at the 1% level. 
 
Column (a) indicates that an FTA increases members’ bilateral trade by less than 17%, 
on average, relative to countries not belonging to a CU or an FTA.9 However, a CU 
increases the same by about 77%.The difference seems to be even more stark once 
the lagged and anticipatory effects in columns (b), (c), and (d) come into play. For each 
of these specifications, the cumulative effect of an FTA or a CU is obtained by adding 
the statistically significant lag, lead, and contemporaneous coefficients. The coefficients 
in (b) imply that while an FTA increases members’ trade by about 25%, a CU brings 
about an increase of more than 90%, after five years.10 Similarly, the results in (c) find 
FTA and CU members to engage in 26% and 110% more bilateral trade, respectively, 
after a decade. This is reminiscent of the principal result in BB (2007, p. 72), who find 
that, “on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members’ bilateral trade after 10 
years.” However, the results here hold only CUs responsible for this. Thus, pooling all 
FTAs and CUs into a single trade agreement dummy masks this crucial information. 
 
Specification (d) continues to find CU members to engage in more bilateral trade while 
allowing for anticipatory effects of trade agreements. Unlike the findings in BB (2007), 
but similar to those in Magee (2008), these effects turn out to be significant. 
A closer look at the cross-section and panel PPML results, Tables 3 and 4, suggests 
that concern over possible selection bias is well-founded. The significant 
contemporaneous trade agreement coefficients are similar in sign across both. 
However, the same cannot be said of their magnitudes as the cross-section FTA 
coefficients are clearly more positive, whereas the CU coefficients are of similar 
magnitude in the cross-section and panel analyses. This suggests a positive selection 
bias for FTA members on the basis of time-invariant unobservables. Conversely, the 
similarity in magnitude of the significant contemporaneous CU coefficients across 
Tables 3 and 4 is consistent with a lack of nonrandom selection into CUs. 
 
While the results are consistent with a lack of nonrandom selection into CUs, it is vital to 
note that the results do not contradict the existence of a negative selection bias 
 
Table 4. Panel Estimates of the PPML Specification (including observations with zero trade) 
 
 
into FTAs found in BB (2007), or nonrandom selection into CUs. To see this, consider 
decomposing the error term in the gravity model into three components: unobservables 
that promote trade, unobservables that hinder trade, and an idiosyncratic component. 
While one example of the former might include past political affinity, Magee (2003, p. 1) 
provides additional examples while discussing “the natural trading partner hypothesis.” 
Haveman and Hummels (1998, p. 62) also opine that “high levels of intra-bloc trade 
may be due not to the formation of preferential trading arrangements but rather to 
historical or political relationships between bloc members.” On the other hand, BB 
(2007) offer the example of stringent internal shipping regulations as an unobservable 
that hinders trade. Now, countries might select into PTAs on the basis of both types of 
unobservable, and the nature of overall selection bias would depend on the dominant 
type. 
 
By employing the OLS specification, BB (2007) find evidence of negative selection, 
which is also supported by the panel results from Tables 1 and 5 in this paper. 
However, 
Table 5. Panel Estimates of the OLS Specification (excluding observations with zero trade) 
 
 
once the more reliable PPML estimator is employed, the selection bias appears to 
matter only for FTAs and not CUs, and the overall selection bias is found to be positive 
for FTAs. Thus, the PPML results are consistent with a situation where the amount of 
positive selection into CUs is almost completely offset by an equal amount of negative 
selection. However, for FTAs, the negative selection effect is weaker, resulting in a net 
positive selection bias. The greater negative selection into CUs is plausible because it is 
typically assumed to be a more integrated trade regime and thus would lead to greater 
welfare gains in the presence of strong unobservables hindering bilateral trade (such as 
domestic shipping regulations). In light of such selection issues, it is essential to use 
both panel fixed effects and the PPML in order to draw reliable conclusions. 
 
Panel Results after Splitting the Sample 
Table 6 re-examines the findings in Table 4 by using the same lag and lead 
specifications, but after splitting the sample. While columns (a), (b), (c), and (d) report 
results using data from 1960 to 1985, results in (e), (f), (g), and (h) correspond to the 
years 1990 to 2000.The split addresses any tension between the time dimension of the 
data and the assumption of time-invariant unobservables. Accordingly, the results in 
Table 6 are less sensitive to the possibility of crucial unobservables varying over time. 
The results  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Panel Estimates of the PPML Specification (including observations with zero trade), after 
Splitting the Sample 
 
 
further strengthen the findings in Table 4. In both samples the contemporaneous and 
cumulative effects of a CU are significantly greater than those of an FTA. For the years 
1960 to 1985, CUs more than double the volume of members’ bilateral trade across all 
the specifications except (a), where the increase is by about 85%.The differences in the 
FTA and CU coefficients are smaller when only the years 1990 to 2000 are considered. 
However, the ranking of the two PTA regimes, in terms of members’ bilateral trade, 
remains unaltered. 
 
For both samples in Table 6, individual and joint tests continue to reject the equality of 
the coefficients on the trade agreement dummies, and on their lag and lead terms. This 
finding for the 1990 to 2000 sample is especially interesting when compared to the 
cross-section test of equality results. Although cross-section results from the OLS 
specification suggest significant differences in the FTA and CU coefficients after 1970, 
the Table 3 results suggest the same, but up to 1970. However, once crucial 
unobservables are also controlled for, FTA and CU members are found to engage in 
significantly different volumes of bilateral trade, in more recent times as well. 
Incidentally, the OLS results in Table 7 also find CUs to promote more bilateral trade 
than FTAs. 
 
Panel Results after Controlling for EU 
According to Krueger (1999, p. 106), up to the late 1970s, the EU “was by far the most 
successful customs union.” Hence, whether the EU’s success is primarily responsible 
for this paper’s findings, remains a relevant concern.Tables 8 and 9 aim to address this 
issue by considering a separate dummy variable for the EU. In other words, the EU 
variable takes the value one for a pair of EU countries, and zero otherwise. The CU 
dummy is assigned a value of one only to country pairs belonging to CUs other than the 
EU. However, the FTA variable remains unchanged. Given the previous findings, only 
the PPML method using the panel fixed effects method is relied on. Lags and leads, 
characteristic of the other panel tables, are also included. While Table 8 utilizes the 
entire sample, Table 9 considers a split similar to the one in Table 6. 
 
The results are striking. Across all specifications using the full sample (Table 8), the 
cumulative effects are greatest for countries belonging to CUs other than the EU. 
Individual and joint tests continue to reject the null of equality, at the 1% level, for each 
pair of the trade agreement dummies. Hence, even the CU members, which do not 
belong to the EU, continue to engage in significantly greater volumes of bilateral trade 
than FTA members. The cumulative effects also find bilateral trade to be significantly 
greater for EU members relative to the FTA members. Most interestingly, EU members 
engage in significantly less bilateral trade than countries belonging to the other CUs. 
Thus, the EU does not influence the ranking of FTAs and CUs, previously obtained. 
Hence, the full-sample results suggest that the other CUs such as the CACM and the 
Caribbean Community (Caricom) were more successful in promoting bilateral trade. In 
fact, support for this argument can be found in Baier et al. (2007), who consider the 
CACM and the Caricom to have been successful CUs. Although, the CACM was mostly 
ineffective between the late 1970s and 1990, the Caricom remained continually 
effective. 
 
For the 1960 to 1985 sample, in Table 9, the volume of bilateral trade is significantly 
greater among the EU members, than countries belonging to FTAs or other CUs. Also, 
the cumulative effects in columns (a), (b), (c), and (d) fail to unambiguously rank 
members belonging to FTAs and other CUs. However, following a revival of the CACM 
and the continued success of the Caricom, CUs are found to promote the most bilateral 
trade for the period from 1990 to 2000. This is consistent with the claims of Krueger  
 
Table 7. Panel Estimates of the OLS Specification (excluding observations with zero trade), after 
Splitting the Sample 
 
Table 8. Panel Estimates of the PPML Specification (including observations with zero trade) 
 
 
Table 9. Panel Estimates of the PPML Specification (including observations with zero trade), after 
Splitting the Sample 
 
(1999) and BB (2009), who consider the EU effect to diminish after 1970. As a result, 
other CUs are found to encourage more bilateral trade in the 1990 to 2000 sample. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Analyses pertaining to FTAs and CUs are significant for trade policy decisions. The 
policy issue seems to be of even greater relevance today, when Fiorentino et al. (2007) 
consider CUs to be characterized by declining popularity. This paper is the first 
empirical contribution to directly compare the two PTA regimes while addressing biases 
due to crucial time-invariant unobservables and log-linearization of the gravity model. 
While BB (2007) address the former, the latter is found to be of significant relevance as 
well.  Once both biases are addressed, the results are striking. BB (2007, p. 72) find 
that, “on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members’ bilateral trade after 10 
years.” However, this paper uses the same data, concluding that it is actually a CU that 
is responsible for this. 
 
In general, members of a CU are found to engage in significantly greater volumes of 
bilateral trade than FTA members. Strikingly, the finding remains unaltered on 
controlling for a separate EU effect, or on splitting the sample. Although some of the 
initial success of CUs can be attributed to the EU, the latter’s prominence disappears in 
more recent years. 
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